The ''new paradigm'' unifying deductive and inductive reasoning in a Bayesian framework (Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Over, 2009) has been claimed to be falsified by results which show sharp differences between reasoning about necessity vs. plausibility (Heit & Rotello, 2010; Rips, 2001; Rotello & Heit, 2009). We provide a probabilistic model of reasoning with modal expressions such as ''necessary'' and ''plausible'' informed by recent work in formal semantics of natural language, and show that it predicts the possibility of non-linear response patterns which have been claimed to be problematic. Our model also makes a strong monotonicity prediction, while two-dimensional theories predict the possibility of reversals in argument strength depending on the modal word chosen. Predictions were tested using a novel experimental paradigm that replicates the previously-reported response patterns with a minimal manipulation, changing only one word of the stimulus between conditions. We found a spectrum of reasoning ''modes'' corresponding to different modal words, and strong support for our model's monotonicity prediction. This indicates that probabilistic approaches to reasoning can account in a clear and parsimonious way for data previously argued to falsify them, as well as new, more fine-grained, data. It also illustrates the importance of careful attention to the semantics of language employed in reasoning experiments.
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Introduction
Suppose that you have learned a new biological fact about mammals: whales and dogs both use enzyme B-32 to digest their food. Is it now necessary that horses do the same? Is it plausible, possible, or more likely than not? Expressions of this type-known as epistemic modals in linguistics-have played a crucial, though neglected, role in recent work that argues for a sharp qualitative distinction between inductive and deductive modes of reasoning. In the paradigm introduced by Rips (2001) and extended by Heit and Rotello (2010) and Rotello and Heit (2009), participants are divided into two conditions and are either asked to judge whether a conclusion is ''necessary'' assuming that some premises are true, or whether it is ''plausible''. The former was identified with the deductive mode of reasoning, and the latter with the inductive mode.
These authors asked participants in both conditions to evaluate a variety of arguments, some of which were valid under classical logic and some invalid under classical logic, or contingent. An example contingent argument might be ''Cows have sesamoid bones; Mice have sesamoid bones; therefore, Horses have sesamoid bones''. An example valid argument might be ''Mammals have sesamoid bones; therefore, horses have sesamoid bones.'' They found that http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.016 0010-0277/Ó 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
